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Abstract 
In this paper, the contents and meaning of coal Industry coordinated development is analyzed. Based on the 
investigation and study of many coal cities such as Zaozhuang, Jincheng, Datong, Huainan, Xinwen, and so on, the 
empirical analysis of coal industry coordinated development path was carried on. From the perspective of game 
theory, the study not only indicates the coordinated cost sharing betwen coal city and coal enterprise buy also 
illustrates a reasonable taxes and fees payment system for the coal industry. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the synergetics was established by theoretical physics professor Herman Haken of Stuttgart 
University in Germany, its theory and method are applied  to mining city and enterprise study by many 
scholars. Mu Dong breaks the boundary of mining area and city, establishes the min ing system, gives the 
assessment method of “coordination” and “development” effective degree, obtains the synthetic 
evaluation target of region coordination development and proposes the policy and suggestion [1-2]. Liu 
Qingzhi and Guo Fenglan discuss the rule of coal enterprise and coal city coordination development [3]. 
Tian Kai and other scholars propose integrating the mining enterprise into the planning scope of mining 
urban development to build the coordination development theoretical system, taking the stage 
coordination development as content [4]. Li Yingde and others study the coal enterprise coordinated 
 
*Corresponding author. Tel.: 0531-8 276 9233. 
E-mail address: stu_liuzh@126.com. 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.  
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of RIUDS
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Liu Zhanhong / Energy Procedia 5 (2011) 1796–1802 1797
development model and content and construct the coal enterprise coordinated development system [5]. The 
coordination development of coal industry needs not only the theoretical research but also the institutional 
innovations. Most of the researches are insufficient in the aspect how to realize the coal industry 
coordination development, and they are limited in qualitative description especially lacking the scientific 
and strict confirmation method in coordinated institution innovations. The study in this paper adopts the 
game analysis method and computes scientifically the coordination cost and the assignment proportion of 
that in coal industry and coal city. The study indicates that the coal industry should pay high taxes and 
fees, undertake its dutiable social responsibility and build a reasonable taxes and fees system, which is 
very important to realize the coordination development strategy of the coal industry. 
2. Game Analysis  of Coal Industry Coordinated Development 
The coal industry coordinated development belongs to a win-win strategy choice during the mutual 
game process between the coal industry and its location’s commanding government under the sustainable 
development request. This paper exp lains the economic relationships between coal city go vernment and 
enterprise from the aspects of their game in the paying of tax revenue as well as various expense. 
2.1. Suppositions and condition of question 
The coal industry coordinated development cannot leave the fund investment, however, the public 
goods attribute of the cooperative product makes the cooperative investment main ly come from the 
government finance income and the coal industry undertakes a small share in the allocation of 
coordination cost. Most of the cooperative invests are used in improving t he mining  area environment, 
enhancing the infrastructure condition and supporting and developing the key industry. Obviously, the 
coal city government’s investment can provide a good environment for the enterprise’s development and 
enable the enterprise to obtain more talented people, information and advanced technical support, which 
are all beneficial to the enterprise’s long-term development in the future. The coal enterprise’s capital 
funds majorly derive from the coal enterprise’s operating income. To s implify the question, it is supposed 
that the enterprise’s cooperative investment is controlled completely by the coal city government with the 
form of paying each item of taxes and fees, then the question of coordination cost allocation transforms 
into the games of tax revenue and expense paying between the coal city and the coal enterprise. 
Suppose St as the coal city financial revenue, λ as the proportion of the coal city financial revenue 
accounting for the coal enterprise’s paying taxes and fees, Yt as the coal enterprise receipt, γ as the coal 
enterprise’s taxes and fees paying proportion, then the coal city’s revenue function is: 
St=Yt* γ / λ                                                                                                                                           (1) 
Using the Cobb-Douglas function to express the coal enterprise’s receives, its form is: 
Yt=A × Ktα × Ltβ                                                                                                                                   (2) 
s.t.     wLt + rKt ≤ (1-γ) Yt-1 
In which, Kt, Lt refer to the input of coal enterprise capital and labor force in the tth  year respectively, 
α, β refer to the output elasticity coefficient of the coal enterprise capital and the labor force respectively, 
r represents the capital price, w  is the labor force price, (1-γ) Yt-1 stands the coal enterprises’ cost 
constraints for the tth year. 
Suppose the information is complete, the coal city draws up the taxes and fees standard at the end of  t-
1th year and the coal enterprise decides the capital and work inputs at the beginning of the tth year, then 
both of them are considered to make the decision at the same time and they will carry on repeatedly when 
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alternating during each plan. Therefore, the both sides’ game problem is the limited redundant game in 
the dynamic complete information game, and the game when each stage alternates can be regarded as 
static complete information game. 
2.2. Model formulation 
Applying the Lagrange multip lier to calculate the coal enterprise’s maximum cap ital and work input, 
the expression is: 
Kt* =α (1-γ) * Yt-1 /[r* (α+β)]                                                                                                              (3) 
Lt* =£(1-γ) * Yt-1 /[w* (α+β)]  
Substitute formula (3) into formula (1) and the results can be settled into: 
St = γ*A {α* Yt-1 /[ r* (α+β)]}α * {β* Yt-1 / [ w* (α+β)]}β * (1-γ)α+β/λ                                               (4) 
From the formula (4) , it can be referred that Kt* and Lt* are decided by the coal industry’s handing in 
taxes and fees proportion γ when the conditions such as w , r , α and β are known already.  
Let Q = γ*(1-γ)α+β   and    dQ/dγ = 0, then: 
γ* =1 / (α+β+1)                                                                                                                                   (5) 
Substitute formula (5) into formula (3), the result is:  
Kt* =α * Yt-1 /[r* (α+β+1)]                                                                                                                 (6) 
Lt* =β * Yt-1 /[w* (α+β+1)] 
1 / (α+β+1) , α  /[r* (α+β+1)] and β /[w* (α+β+1)] are just the only Nash equilibrium solution fo r the 
game between the coal city and the coal enterprise during the planning period  [6]. 
2.3. Game analysis 
The analysis of the above Nash equilibrium solution concludes that the taxes and fees capture 
proportion factor is inversely proportional to the capital investment and the labor force elasticity. As the 
coal industrial capital investment elasticity and the labor force elasticity are relat ively low, so only when 
the taxes and fees proportion factor co llected by the coal city maintains a high  level can it  realizes the 
“win-win” strategy in the industrial development funding investment aspect of coal city and coal 
enterprise. 
Through Kt* =α * Yt-1 /[r* (α+β+1)]  , it is concluded that the optimum cap ital inputs of the coal 
industry is in p roportion to the capital elasticity coefficient, that is, the coal enterprise is willing to invest 
the fund into the high output industry rather than high cost industry. This becomes the motive power 
foundation with the depletion of the coal city’s coal resource, the increasin g cost of coal selection 
industry and the coal enterprise’s seeking of diversified  production. Along with the diversified p roduction 
and increasing capital output elasticity and labor force output elasticity, the coal city’s taxes and fees 
capture proportion will also adjust downward thereby, which is a dynamic process. 
For the problem of coal city and coal enterprise’s coordination cost allocation, if the coal enterprise 
conceals the actual profit level and pays less taxes and fees to the urban government, it will make the 
financial revenue grow in  restricted way and go  against the coordinated development between the coal 
city and enterprise. More coal enterprise’s investment can obtain the investment yield in a short time, if 
the taxes paying is too high, it will h inder the enterprise’s expanded reproduction and the implementation 
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of mult iplication developmental strategy; this will limit the enterprise’s inevitably  and thus affect the 
growth of coal city income. Therefore, the coal city and coal enterprise’s tax revenue and expense paying 
game is in  fact the assignment problem of coal city and  coal enterprise in long -term and short-term 
benefit aspect under the condition of limited fund. Any far-seeing entrepreneur will support the 
coordination strategy between coal enterprise and coal city on the fund use.  
3. The Empirical Analysis of Coordination Cost 
Through the game analysis of coal industry coordinated development model, it can be concluded that 
the economic basis of coal industry coordinated development is the sharing of coordination cost. This 
paper selects five large-scale coal mine groups in Datong, Jincheng, Xinwen, Zaozhuang and Huai Nan to 
inspect the coal city’s coordination cost question. 
3.1. Analysis and calculation of elasticity coefficient 
According to the Cobb-Douglas function, the labor elasticity coefficient α and capital elasticity 
coefficient β produced by the coal enterprise group that is commanded by each coal city are computed by 
the mult i-element non-linear regression analysis method, and the computation result is showed in Table 1. 
After examin ing the computation result, each coal enterprise group’s production function fitting condition 
is very good.  
Table 1  The computed result of elasticity coefficient about coal enterprise capital and work 
 Datong Xinwen Huainan Jincheng Zaozhuang 
α 0.101 0.448 1.215 0.07 0.47 
β 1.038 1.622 0.644 1.022 1.55 
The following conclusion could be obtained after analyzing the data in Table 1: 
(1) If each coal enterprise matches the conditions of α+β>1, it belongs to the increasing returns to 
scale type which shows that it is advantageous to increase the output by expanding the coal enterprise 
production scale according to the existing technology. In which, the Datong Coal Mine Group Limited 
Company and Jincheng Anthracite Mine Industry Group Limited Company match the conditions of 
α+β≈1 , which shows that the coal enterprise’s production efficiency enhances with small scale along 
with the production scale’s expansion. Therefore, only focusing on the  enhancing of technical level can 
the economic efficiency increase. 
 (2) Datong Coal Mine Group Limited Company and Jincheng Anthracite Mine Industry Group 
Limited Company have small α  value and bigger β value, which indicates that the share by works 
contribution is small in two enterprise’s output values, while the share from the capital contribution is 
relatively big. 
3.2. γ* analysis calculation 
γ* refers to the index of coal industry coordination cost accounting for the output value income, and 
computed result is listed in Table 2. 
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Table 2 The computed result  of γ* about coal enterprise 
 Datong  Xinwen Huainann Jincheng Zaozhuang 
γ* 0.4675 0.333 0.3498 0.4739 0.333 
The pluralized management percentage  10.95% 60.52% 11.8% 41.9% 53.33% 
The heavy industry proportion  97% 83.4% 85.2% 98.5% 76.1% 
From Fig.1, the fo llowing  conclusions could be gained after comparing the correlation between  γ* and 
the coal enterprise’s multiplication management percentage target, γ* and the proportion target that heavy 
industry output value accounting for the second industry. 
 (1) There is such one rule except Jincheng Anthracite Mine Industry Group Limited Company: if the 
proportion of coal enterprise’s mult iplication managementis high, the corresponding γ* will be s mall; the 
two sides have a negative correlation. 
 (2) γ* is proportionally related with the heavy industry in the enterprise’s mult iplication industrial 
structure, the bigger proportion, the bigger γ*. Although Jincheng Mining Group owns a high 
multip licat ion management proportion, its industrial structure mainly includes the high energy-consuming 
and high pollution industries like the coal electricity industry, carbonification industry and so on, 










Fig.1  The relation of coal enterprise multiplication management and γ*  
(3) On the whole, the important ways to reduce the coordination cost cover implement ing the 
multip licat ion management strategy in the coal enterprise, raising the constitution proportion of the 
primary industry and the tertiary industry, developing the high technical and low energy-consuming 
products in the second industry and raising the output.  
3.3. Contrastive analysis of coordination costs and actual tax amount 
If the coal enterprise’s delivering taxes and fees amounts are all taken as the coordination cost of coal 
city and coal enterprise, then the coordination cost is the product of enterprise’s output value and γ*. The 
coordination cost computation results of coal city enterprise are shown in Table 3. 
Conclusion:  
After comparing and analyzing the coal enterprise’s coordination cost, coal enterprise’ actual tax 
amount, coal city’s expenditure and other data in 2008, it can be concluded that the coordination cost of 
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coal enterprise in coal city is much higher than the coal enterprise’s actual tax amount and also higher 
than the coal city’s expenditure. On one hand, this fact indicates that the community responsibility 
undertaken by the coal enterprise in  the process of city and enterprise coordinated development is s maller 
than the part that itself should undertake; on the other hand, it illustrates that the coal city’s expenditure is 
insufficient to pay the coordination cost, which becomes an important reason that the coal industry cannot 
cooperate at present. 
Table 3 The contrastive analysis of the coal city and the coal enterprise about coordination cost˄Million yuan˅ 
 Datong Xinwen Huainan Jincheng Zaozhuang 
Coordination cost 1206444 508877.3 440682.9 861060.7 540404.4
Actual tax amount 255117 116432 130578 191263 150696 
Financial expenditure 469000 160998 253600 313200 482300 
 
4. The Strategy 
Through the above analysis, the author believes that the problem of coal industry coordinated 
development is in fact the problem of the coordination cost collection and sharing. There are some 
important ways to settle this problem: it is necess ary to compute the γ* value for the local taxes and fees’ 
payment; determine the coal enterprise’s dutiable lowest taxes and fees rate based on the area’s actual 
development situation as well as the coal industrial’s development condition; construct a reasonable taxes 
and fees payment system for the coal industry; support the coal industry’s coordinated development by 
the financial policy. 
As shown in Fig. 2, the specific implement ways is as follows: 
 
 
Fig. 2 Taxes and fees system of coal industry 
The goals of establishing the coal industry’s taxes and fees system are: first, take the coal enterprise’s 
“Rational Economic Person” as the supposition condition, urge the coal enterprise to choose the 
coordinated development strategies  consciously like diversified productive investment, enhancement of 
the coal utilization efficiency, increasing of the coal enterprise’s investment efficiency and so on with 
economic means; Second, increase the coal city’s special ability  to process coordinated development 
problems by means of charging special taxes and fees like additional tax of education, farm land 
occupation tax, urban construction and maintain ing tax and so on. It should be noted that the coal 
enterprise’s production enthusiasm and sustainable development can not be damaged while increasing the 
coal enterprise’s taxes and fees paying proportion; the state should add the coal industry’s privilege and 
 Fixed Asset Direction Adjustment Tax 
 Resource Tax 
Urban Construction and Maintaining Tax 
Farm Land Occupation Tax 
Additional Tax of Education 
Diversified Production 
Make the Best of Resources 
Environment Coordination 
Preserve the Land 
Enhancement of Labor Force Quality 
Value Added Tax Enterprise Production Refinement 
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transfer payment in the policy, fund, talented person, infrastructural facilities  construction aspects; it is 
very hard to realize the coordinated development strategy when depending on the coal city and industry’s 
own strength only. 
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